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Abstract
The European Parliament (EP) – today one of the most powerful actors at EU level – was intended
to be a mere consultative assembly at the founding of the European Communities. This article
studies the beginnings of the EP’s parliamentarization, from its establishment in 1952 to its first
direct elections in 1979. The article uses the concept of Europeanization to analyse what idea-
tional, normative and rationalist factors induced MEPs – delegates from the member states’ na-
tional parliaments at the time – to invest considerable time and effort into an institution that
promised no significant political impact, career improvement, or acknowledgement by voters. In
so doing, the article demonstrates that despite the fact that careers were made at the national level,
MEPs swiftly began to behave as Euro-parliamentarians rather than national delegates. Inside the
EP, MEPs were therefore both themselves Europeanized and pushed for the Europeanization of the
EP more generally.
Keywords: European Parliament; Europeanization; European integration; parliamentarization; Euro-
pean Community
Introduction
The European Parliament (EP) is today one of the most powerful actors at the EU level.
Yet it was not intended to be more than a consultative assembly at the founding of the Eu-
ropean Communities in the 1950s. This article argues that the relatively swift evolution of
the EP from an alleged ‘talking shop’ into a co-legislator cannot be understood without
taking into consideration the crucial role of members of the EP (MEPs) in
‘parliamentarizing’ the EP. Whereas much research has shed light on the role played by
MEPs in the institutionalization and professionalization of the EP since its first direct
elections in 1979, and until today (see Daniel, 2015; Kreppel, 2002; Knudsen, 2014;
Ripoll Servent, 2018), this article focuses exclusively on the beginnings of this process,
namely from the EP’s establishment in 1952 until 1979. It demonstrates that many of
the processes that have been found to be at the basis of the EP’s empowerment
post-1979 have their roots in the 1950s–70s. Among them are, in more formal terms,
the EP’s gain in legislative, budgetary and control power (Rittberger, 2005). This article
examines how MEPs’ behaviour shaped the empowerment and professionalization of
the EP by tracing the Europeanization processes in the EP at a micro (individual MEPs),
meso (party groups and committees) and macro (EP) level. It agrees with Daniel (2015, p.
4) that ‘[i]n the realm of legislative studies, legislators themselves are the closest we can
get to observing the pulse of a legislative institution’.
In studying the EP’s institutional development prior to 1979 from this perspective, the
article focuses on a period of the EP’s evolution which is still significantly understudied,
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based not least on the misconception that the relatively powerless position of the EP
which the Treaties provided corresponded to the EP’s actual institutional role in Commu-
nity policy-making. Those studies that take into account the EP pre-1979 often focus
merely on the EP’s formal gain in power – notably through Treaty changes (see
Kardasheva, 2009; Rittberger, 2005; Viola, 2016) – and on events with a significant im-
pact on the EP’s position in relation to other Community institutions, such as the negoti-
ations of a European Defence and Political Community (Corbett et al., 2003;
Rittberger, 2006), and the Empty Chair crisis (Lindner and Rittberger, 2003;
Krumrey, 2018). This article points out the added value of studying more gradual and of-
ten initially informal changes through evolving routines, and the role of individual MEPs
in everyday policy-making.1 This, in particular, adds to the existing literature on the early
EP, much of which treats the early parliament as a unitary actor, overlooking the impact of
individual delegates on the empowerment of the EP.
The article applies the concept of Europeanization to analyse the ideational, normative
and rational factors that induced MEPs – delegates from the member states’ national par-
liaments at the time – to invest considerable time and effort into an institution that prom-
ised them virtually no significant political impact, no career improvement, and no
acknowledgement by voters. In so doing, the article demonstrates that despite the fact that
careers were made at the national level, MEPs swiftly began to behave as
Euro-parliamentarians rather than national delegates, based on their shared convictions
and ideas of European integration. Inside the EP, MEPs were therefore both themselves
Europeanized, and pushed for the Europeanization of the EP more generally.
The article opens with a section outlining the theoretical approach applied in the sub-
sequent analysis – with the concept of Europeanization at its centre, combined with the
concepts and tools of sociological and rational choice institutionalism. This theoretical
outline is followed by a brief chronology of the EP’s institutional evolution prior to
1979, in order to provide the historical context which is necessary to understand MEPs’
behaviour and the consequences of their activism for the EP’s development.
The following analysis of Europeanization processes in the EP on a micro, meso and
macro level focuses on norms, ideas and interests underlying MEPs’ behaviour, on impor-
tant factors in MEPs’ socialization prior to entering the EP, and on the delegates’ immer-
sion in the EP’s internal structure and working procedures, notably within the EP’s party
groups and committees. Moreover, the article sheds light on the role played by a small
group of particularly activist MEPs who became norm entrepreneurs by steering EP
policy-making procedures and shaping the norms internalized by the bulk of MEPs as a
basis of their Community-level behaviour. These norm entrepreneurs are shown to have
significantly propelled Europeanization processes in the EP.
Sources: Archival Documents and Personal Accounts
The article is based on a corpus of about 250 EP documents that was assembled and
consulted at the Historical Archives of the EP (HAEP) in Luxembourg (partly by key-
word search in the HAEP’s internal archival system, and partly by manual consultation
of all Official Journals of the European Communities from the period 1952–79), the
1For the area of environmental policy, Meyer (2014) has presented insightful studies of MEPs’ everyday attempts to influ-
ence Community legislation, and to strengthen the EP’s role in Community agenda-setting.
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Historical Archives of the EU in Florence, and the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe
in Lausanne. This dataset consists of resolutions, reports, parliamentary questions, mi-
nutes of debates and working documents on important events and developments in the
EP’s institutional evolution, concerning, for instance, changes to the EP’s rules of proce-
dure, and demands for a strengthened role of the EP in Community politics. An in-depth
source analysis of these documents, based on a qualitative content analysis methodology,2
provides detailed insight into the EP’s functioning, its structure and procedures, as well as
its members’ perception of how their institution should work.
In addition to the dataset of archival documents, the following analysis builds on per-
sonal accounts by contemporary witnesses. The author conducted 24 semi-structured in-
terviews and e-mail exchanges with former MEPs and EP staff. Interviews were between
half an hour and 5 hours long, with an average length of approximately 2 hours. Contacts
were established with the help of the HAEP and the EP’s Former Members Association,
and later with the help of the interviewees themselves. The author sought to speak to as
many MEPs as possible or reachable. Eventually, statements were collected from former
MEPs from all member states and party groups represented in the EP prior to 1979. Un-
fortunately, for practical reasons, the sample of interviewees is biased in terms of the pe-
riod it covers. Most interviewees sat in or worked for the EP in the 1970s, and some in the
second half of the 1960s. Due to the number of years that have passed since the period
under examination, the author had difficulties finding MEPs who held a European man-
date in the 1950s or early 1960s.
All interviewees were asked the same list of questions. Among other issues, they were
asked about their personal, educational and professional background, their way into and
out of the EP, the positions they held within and outside the EP, the structure and working
procedures of the EP and its committees and party groups, their perceptions of the EP’s
role and powers in Community politics, and MEP and EP relations with other Community
institutions as well as with national parliaments and parties. In addition to these questions,
the author discussed with interviewees in more detail their unique experiences as MEP
and EP staff, and in several cases also as members or staff of other Community
institutions.3
The additional insights acquired through the interviews were crucial to this research,
given that much EP activism prior to 1979 took place in informal settings, and was not
recorded on any medium. The interview material was analysed based on an oral history
methodology (see McGrath, 2009; Ritchie, 2015; Thompson and Bornat, 2017): the ma-
terial was contextualized, if necessary filtered, and most importantly cross-checked as far
as possible through consultations of secondary literature, the above-mentioned written
primary sources, and through similar questions to other MEPs as well as follow-up inter-
views with individual interviewees. This careful treatment of the interviewees’ statements
was necessary because, for one reason or other, some contemporary witnesses tend to
2Following Mayring (2014), the sources were conitextualized, divided into content analytical units, categorized with regard
to different formal and contentual aspects and levels, and interpreted within the framework set by the previous steps of con-
tent analysis, by the chosen theoretical approach, and by the underlying research question.
3More detailed information on the dataset of this article, which forms a part of a larger research project on the EP’s insti-
tutional evolution prior to 1979, can be found at the author’s website: https://mechthildroos.eu/research/the-european-par-
liament-prior-to-1979-told-by-former-meps-and-staff/.
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generalize, exhibit nostalgia, mix up details, or present some facts in a way to appear in
the best possible light.
Evolution of the EP through the Lens of Europeanization
This article draws on the theoretical approach of Europeanization, defined by
Featherstone (2003, p. 3) as ‘a process of structural change [closely identified with some
form of an integrated ‘Europe’], variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and in-
terests’. In its analysis of the EP’s institutional evolution prior to its first direct elections,
this study does not approach Europeanization in the usual terms as a vertical two-way
process of European integration with an impact on domestic policies and polities, or of
the influence of domestic policies and polities on European integration. With
Radaelli (2003, p. 41), this article focuses instead first and foremost on the horizontal
Europeanization of national actors at the supranational level, that is, processes of ‘change
triggered by […] the diffusion of ideas and discourses about the notion of good policy and
best practice’ among actors at the European level.
The only element of vertical Europeanization in the following analysis concerns the
background of MEPs at the time. Prior to 1979, all MEPs were national parliamentarians
who were delegated by their home parliaments to the EP. This implies not only that an EP
mandate was a part-time occupation, but also that MEPs’ political careers remained for-
mally dependent on national – not European – parties, politics and performance evalua-
tion. Despite this fact, MEPs acted like Euro-parliamentarians rather than national
representatives from the 1950s, as discussed below. The MEPs’ background as national
parliamentarians was relevant not only from their career point of view, but also with re-
gard to their perceptions of what constituted a typical west European parliament. The fol-
lowing analysis examines the subsequent dimension of vertical Europeanization. MEPs
sought to transfer procedures and structures that typically shaped the work of national par-
liaments to the Community level, in order to ‘parliamentarize’4 the EP. In the process of
adapting such procedures and structures so as to improve the EP’s involvement in Com-
munity politics, the process of vertical transfer blended into horizontal implementation
and adjustment processes, given the major differences in tasks and powers between na-
tional parliaments and the EP, and between the political and institutional systems of mem-
ber states, on the one hand, and the Communities, on the other.
To operationalize the broad concept of Europeanization beyond a distinction of vertical
and horizontal processes, the following analysis draws on the conceptual toolbox of insti-
tutionalism. The compatibility of institutionalist and Europeanization approaches has
been shown in previous research, as discussed by Featherstone (2003, p. 12). Regarding
the analysis of the early EP’s institutional evolution, this article argues with Mühlböck
and Rittberger (2015) that a combination of different institutionalist schools provides sig-
nificant analytical added value: applying rational choice and sociological institutionalist
concepts allows the analyst to highlight a wider variety of factors influencing institutional
dynamics and institutionalization processes than either of these approaches would achieve
if applied on its own. Combining them within the framework of Europeanization, in turn,
4Thus expressed by the interviewee Horst Seefeld (Interview 1). All interviewees are quoted in this article in English.
Quotes from interviews that were not conducted in English (but in German, French, or Italian) have been translated by
the author.
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allows the following analysis to trace processes ‘of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c)
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles,
“ways of doing things”, and shared beliefs and norms’ (Radaelli, 2003, p. 30). In other
words, this hybrid theoretical approach provides the opportunity to emphasize the impor-
tance of informal processes alongside formal ones, to study the interaction of norms and
interests, of logics of appropriateness and logics of consequentiality.5 Thus, these different
institutionalist concepts drive the analysis below.
It should be noted that this article assumes with Featherstone (2003, p. 4) that Europe-
anization is ‘not necessarily permanent or irreversible’, and that the development of
MEPs’ behaviour was consequently not a one-directional process towards an ever more
Europeanized code of conduct. In the institutional evolution of the EP this is visible,
for example, in the impact of the Communities’ first enlargement on the unity and
integration-related attitudes among MEPs, as outlined below. This article traces processes
of ‘negative’ or de-Europeanization triggered by such incisive events, as well as following
socialization and re-Europeanization developments.
Brief Chronology of the EP’s Institutional Evolution before 1979
When studying the Europeanization of the early EP through its parliamentarization, it is
important to understand the beginning of the institution’s evolution. The EP was not for-
mally intended to be anything like a parliament when it was founded as the Common As-
sembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in the Treaty of Paris, signed on 18
April 1951. This Treaty stipulated the EP’s main – and almost only – task was to control
the European Coal and Steel Community ’s executive, the High Authority. Up until the
EP’s first direct elections in June 1979, all MEPs were national parliamentarians, dele-
gated to the Community level by their home parliaments, and consequently holding a
double mandate. Given limited remit of the EP provided by the Treaty, EP mandates were
considered to be a part-time task, roughly comparable with a delegate’s membership of a
parliamentary committee at the national level.
From the EP’s first plenary session in September 1952, MEPs rejected the limitations
of its scope, as stipulated in the Treaty, and frequently expressed their opinions both on
proposals for Community legislation, and on issues that, in the delegates view, deserved
attention at Community level. In order to work as efficiently as possible within the limited
time and resources available to them, within the first year of the EP’s existence the early
MEPs set up a parliamentary structure of committees (European Parliament, 1953a) and
party groups(European Parliament, 1953b). This structure allowed delegates to cope with
their gradually increasing (and self-assigned) workload.
The 1957 treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to some extent changed the scope of the EP
tasks and responsibilities. Most importantly, the EP’s previously vaguely defined right of
consultation was extended to a number of concrete policy areas (see i.a. Arts. 7, 43, 54,
57, 63, 75, 201, 235 and 238 of the EEC Treaty; and Arts. 31, 85, 96, 203 and 206 of
the Euratom Treaty). Yet, even though the EP obtained a right to express its opinion be-
fore decisions in the respective areas could be made, its opinion had no binding force: the
5For an in-depth definition and conceptualization of both logics, see March and Olsen (2011). Their analytical compatibility
in the context of Europeanization is discussed by Börzel and Risse (2003).
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Council was not obliged to act any differently from the way it would have done without
consulting the EP. This changed to some extent with the two budget treaties of 1970 and
1975, which allowed the EP to reject the newly created Community budget. Moreover,
alongside the 1975 Treaty, a conciliation procedure was introduced that granted the EP
some decision-making power on budget-related issues. Even though the Council retained
the last word, this procedure became crucial in the evolution of the EP’s co-legislative
power. Table 1 provides an overview of the powers and tasks formally attributed to the
EP in the different treaties prior to 1979.
Micro-level Europeanization through Socialization
Prior to the EP’s first direct elections, the matter of combining their national and
European mandate was not easy to solve for many of the MEPs. Some struggled to con-
vince their voters that the time they spent away both from the constituency and the
national parliament was spent in a meaningful and relevant way – after all, as the former
liberal MEP Werner Zywietz stated, ‘the democratic basis demanded that their interests
were sufficiently attended to’ (Interview 9), meaning that delegates had to account for
their distribution of time and efforts between different levels. Ole Espersen, a Danish So-
cialist MEP, remembered that although he ‘had a safe constituency where I was always
elected’, several colleagues were confronted with constituents who asked: ‘Why do you
spend so much time on something that gives us no support? – That was a very common
difficulty in being a member’ of the EP (Interview 2). The British Conservative John Cor-
rie (Interview 12), for instance, had to answer criticisms from his constituents for spend-
ing too much time ‘in Europe’.
Other delegates had to explain to their fellow national parliamentarians why they spent
so much time at the European level. The former Communist MEP Vera Squarcialupi, for
instance, remembered that her national-level colleagues considered her European work
less important than that in the national parliament (Interview 10). This perception was
shared among members of small national parties, as the Dutch former MEP and D66
member Maarten Engwirda recalled from his own experience:
I was at the time in the Dutch Parliament member of a modest group of only 11 per-
sons, so there was a vote whether the group would allow me to go to Strasbourg and to
the European Parliament – and it was a very close vote, six to five, not because my col-
leagues were not pro-European, but they thought: well, if he is away half the time in Stras-
bourg, it gives us more work. (Interview 3)
Given the EP’s weak role as provided by the Treaties, most national delegates who
were about to become MEPs did not expect any career gain from investing their time in
the EP. For many parliamentarians, going to the EP seemed ‘a waste of time’ (Interview
2) in the first place; after all, careers were made at the national level. The MEPs’ signif-
icant investment of time and effort in EP-related work led a number of interviewees to
consider their European engagement as ‘mandate-endangering’ (Interview 9) rather than
conducive to their careers; indeed, some felt their European mandates had a negative im-
pact on their national-level positions.10 To some extent, MEPs were in this regard
10The interviewees Maarten Engwirda (Interview 3) and Hans-Werner Müller (Interview 4) reported having lost out on a
political opportunity through their EP mandates: Engwirda lost a good place on his party’s list in the 1973 national election
(which cost him his seat both in the national parliament, but consequently also in the EP), and Müller a prestigious com-
mittee seat.
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confronted with a level of vertical Europeanization of domestic parliaments and parties
that was too low, in the shape of insufficient knowledge on the side of their national-level
party colleagues, leading to a lack of interest or appreciation at the domestic level for the
work of the EP and its members.
The fact that national parliamentarians nonetheless decided (or agreed) to take on an
EP mandate, and to spend more time in the EP than their national peers expected, suggests
a certain level of Europeanization of their ‘mental frameworks’ (Graziano and Vink, 2013,
p. 40) prior to entering the EP. Indeed, the former MEPs and EP staff interviewed for this
research indicated that very few delegates who were not generally in favour of closer in-
tegration had agreed to go to the EP in the first place.11 An important basis of the MEPs’
openness to getting involved and socialized into the EP hence lay in MEPs’ mind-sets
upon entering. While every MEP was evidently shaped by their individual experiences,
some recurring aspects can be traced in the delegates’ pre-EP socialization. Importantly,
most MEPs prior to 1979 had active memories of the Second World War, and a consider-
able number even remembered the First World War12 and were united in fundamental
agreement that Europe should never see such a war again (Interviews 6, 7, 8 & 9).
Driven by this greater objective, many of the MEPs had become engaged at trans-
national and international level before they were delegated to the EP, in different inter-
national assemblies such as those of the Western European Union, NATO or the
Council of Europe, in transnational trade union organizations or in party associations
like the Socialist International (Knudsen, 2014). Moreover, many spoke one or more
foreign languages, often based on their experiences in other European states during
their school or university education. Indeed, several interviewees indicated that they
were sent to the EP because of their language skills (Interviews 4, 9 & 10). In short,
the EP itself was not the first experience of international or transnational cooperation
and exchange for many of these MEPs; so that the ground of a fundamental openness
to cross-border policy-making had already been laid among MEPs for the norms and
shared ideas of closer political and institutional integration with which the delegates
were confronted upon entering the EP.
It should not be assumed, however, that all delegates came to the EP as pro-
Europeans. The former British Conservative MEP John Corrie, for instance, voted
against Britain’s continued Community membership in the 1975 referendum ‘because
I did not know enough about it’. However, he reflected in the interview with the author,
‘having been there for a short time, I could see the whole principle and ideals were ab-
solutely right, if you kept it at sort of trade level and cooperation as we now have’ (In-
terview 12). The former Danish Socialist MEP Ole Espersen went through a similar
11This was also confirmed for the 1950s by Haas (2004), p. 437. Krumrey (2018, pp. 115-116) states that the MEPs who
were sent to the EP in the 1950s ‘were the parties’ European experts and were often prone to federalist attitudes’, making
the EP ‘a congregation of self-avowed Europeans’. The interviewee Arnaldo Ferragni, working for the Christian Democratic
Group from 1960 and its Secretary-General from 1966 to 1972, said of the EP’s staff members that ‘before the entry of the
UK, all staff members of the EP were pro-European. From the Secretary General to the last usher or driver, everyone con-
sidered themselves engaged in the construction of Europe’ (Interview 5).
12All parliamentarians who held an EP mandate prior to 1979 were born before or – in two cases – in 1945; only about a
dozen were born in the 1940s (this information stems from an unofficial list of MEPs from the period 1952–79 provided by
the Historical Archives of the EP). Given that all member states were involved in both World Wars it can be assumed that all
those MEPs old enough to remember either of the wars had active memories of the war years.
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experience: ‘I voted against being a member of the European Communities, but by and
large I became convinced’ (Interview 2).
Considering the dominating shared basis of generally Europeanized ‘mental frame-
works’ among MEPs, it is not surprising that controversy in the early EP was relatively
low concerning attitudes on political and institutional integration.15 One of the most im-
portant – and almost unanimously shared – ideas was the perceived need and justness
of turning the EP into a fully-fledged supranational parliament (Roos, 2017). This idea
had both normative and rational dimensions: on the one hand, MEPs hoped that a pow-
erful, democratically elected parliament that represented the citizens’ interest would
provide necessary democratic legitimacy to Community politics and policies, and would
at the same time bring the Community project closer to the citizens as constituents of
the MEPs. On the other hand, MEPs had an interest in carving out a more powerful
position for their institution, in order to gain more influence on Community legislation
and the overall integration process. MEPs’ activism towards the vertical Europeaniza-
tion of the EP – in the sense of bringing it closer to the role and powers usually held
by parliaments in liberal democracies – thus followed both a logic of appropriateness
and one of consequentiality.
One indicator of the aspiration shared by most MEPs to turn the EP into a fully fledged
supranational parliament is the way they referred to their institution. In the EP’s inaugural
plenary session after the treaties of Rome entered into force, the MEPs adopted a resolu-
tion substantiating their self-understanding as Euro-parliamentarians. The ‘Assembly’, to
which the Treaties referred, was renamed the ‘European Parliamentary Assembly’ in
French and Italian.16 In German and Dutch, MEPs went a step further by officially calling
their institution the Europäisches Parlament or Europees Parlement, as in these lan-
guages the term ‘assembly’ lacked the necessary significance and prestige that the EP de-
served, in the delegates’ view (Krumrey, 2018, p. 139). During a plenary session on 30
March 1962, in an ‘informal change [...] of major symbolic importance’ (Judge and
Earnshaw, 2008, p. 35), the EP adopted a resolution officially renaming the Communities’
Assembly as the European Parliament in all Community languages (European Parliament,
1962). This resolution had, like all EP resolutions, no legally binding character and con-
stituted first and foremost an expression of the delegates’ self-understanding. Nonethe-
less, the EP’s name changes signify steps in the horizontal Europeanization of the EP
from an assembly of national delegates towards a supranational parliament.
Europeanization through Parliamentarization at the Meso Level
The horizontal Europeanization of the EP depended to a significant extent on the structure
that the early MEPs gave their institution. Fulfilling the EP’s original task of holding the
High Authority and later the Commission accountable once a year would not have re-
quired the formation of party groups. Committees were also not strictly necessary, al-
though they were helpful in competently assesses the different policy areas covered in
the executive’s annual report. The fact that MEPs decided as early as 1953 to establish
15The Dutch former MEP Doeke Eisma recalled one controversy in the early EP: ‘You cannot compare the style of making
policy now and in that time. Because that was more of a nice gathering of people who would talk about the future and the
problems in Europe’ (Interview 11). Similar statements were made by Alain Terrenoire, who spoke of a ‘club atmosphere’ in
the EP (Interview 8), and also in Interviews 2, 3, 12, 13 and 14.
16This is discussed for instance by Krumrey (2018): 128-129.
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a party group and committee system is therefore a strong indication of the delegates’ aim
to turn their assembly into a fully fledged supranational parliament and to act as
Euro-parliamentarians rather than merely national delegates.18
The EP’s meso-level structure swiftly determined parliamentary work in all its partic-
ulars. The main factor determining the distribution of posts such as committee chairman-
ships and rapporteurships was the relative strength of the party groups. Nationality played
some role, as an attempt was made to avoid major imbalances;19 however, group member-
ship was more decisive. The former Dutch Socialist Arie van der Hek, for instance,
recalled an moment when he was given a committee chairmanship
under the influence of the Germans. That was quite reasonable, because I was of the same
opinion on monetary affairs [as the majority of the German delegates]. I was more or less
a German [laughs]. Therefore they said: well, we can’t claim this chairmanship. So we
put […] Arie there, because he has the same opinion. (Interview 15)
Given that the EP party groups and committees were based on models in the member
states’ national and regional parliaments, the EP’s institutional structures were familiar to
MEPs through their national mandates.20 Consequently, MEPs’ socialization into the EP’s
institutional structure and into parliamentary working procedures was generally swift and
simple. The only noteworthy instance of colliding conceptions of parliamentary work un-
folded in the direct aftermath of the Communities’ first enlargement, with the entry of
British, Irish and Danish MEPs. The British delegates, in particular, were used to a parlia-
mentary system of openly confrontational exchanges between the executive and the leg-
islative, whereas much of the work in the EP took place in non-public committee and
party group meetings, with plenary sessions serving a mostly representative purpose. Ini-
tially, ‘the British did not like this at all’, according to the interviewee Arie van der Hek,
‘so they always tried to put things as soon as possible to the plenary. If you have to make
compromises: in the plenary! Not before!’ (Interview 15) Over time, however, most of
them came to appreciate the efficiency of non-public talks, notably when it came to estab-
lishing and upholding contacts with the Commission and the Council – another example
of micro-level horizontal Europeanization.21
The effects of the first enlargement on the EP’s everyday functioning show that the
Europeanization processes in the early EP did not follow a one-directional develop-
ment towards an ever more supranational parliament. This becomes clear when we
look at the changing constellation of party groups in the EP prior to 1979, in which
two instances in particular of ‘negative’ or de-Europeanization – or re-intensification
of the relevance of MEPs’ national background – stand out. First, in January 1965,
the EP reduced the minimum number of MEPs required to form a party group from
17 to 14, thereby allowing a number of French parliamentarians to found an own
group (European Parliament, 1958 and 1965). The resulting Union démocratique
18This was also discussed by Murray (2004), p. 104; Haas (2004), p. 390-391.
19Fionnuala Richardson remembered that ‘there was always a kind of pecking order in terms of nationality’ (Interview 13).
The interviewee Heinz Schreiber also recalled that a balance of party groups and nationalities was always pursued in the
distribution of important posts (Interview 16); see also Hagger and Wing (1979): 120-121.
20The importance of MEPs’ national-level parliamentary experience prior to 1979 is discussed, amongst others, by For-
syth (1964): 70-71.
21This is visible in the engagement of British MEPs in EP committees’ work, as can be deduced from numerous EP minutes
of debate, committee reports, drafts and working documents.
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européenne had a strongly nationalist character, based on the political attitude and na-
tional background of its members – who were in the vast majority French Gaullist
MEPs. Second, the British Labour and Tory MEPs entering the EP in the 1970s fol-
lowing the Communities’ first enlargement made the EP and its party group landscape
considerably more heterogeneous – and to some extent less Europeanized. The newly
formed Conservative Group was heavily dominated by British delegates. The Labour
delegates joined the EP’s Socialist Group.23 However, as several of them were – unlike
the group’s other members – rather eurosceptical upon entering, they initially in-
creased significantly the level of controversy in the group, although many of them
underwent horizontal Europeanization processes of adapting their behaviour to EP rou-
tines, and also of developing more pro-integrationist attitudes.24
Many MEPs – both from old and new member states – entered the EP with rather
vague ideas of concrete policies and the Communities’ institutional functioning. The for-
mer French Socialist MEP Jean-Pierre Cot recalled: ‘When I was in the national parlia-
ment, Europe was quite far away in terms of the mechanics. I was a committed
European on policies, but the mechanics I didn’t know anything about’.25 Such knowledge
was swiftly acquired through the EP’s parliamentary structure of party groups and com-
mittees. The swift socialization of new members into working procedures as well as into
the sets of norms and ideas promoted by fellow group members – a meso-level vertical
Europeanization process – is visible in the persisting intra-group unity that can be traced
throughout the EP’s pre-elections history (Roos, 2019). This intra-group unity is particu-
larly noteworthy not only because the groups consisted of a wide variety of national
parties, but also because they held but a fraction of the means usually held by western
European national parties to enforce party group discipline. The groups’ options to keep
their members in line were limited to offering incentives rather than a real whip, for in-
stance, in the distribution of parliamentary posts. As the party groups bargained over
the distribution of positions such as rapporteurships and committee memberships, MEPs
knew that they were more likely to get their preferred position if they played by their
group’s rules. The inner unity of the EP’s party groups was thus – in the absence of a
whip – sustained to some extent by a logic of consequentiality: MEPs could expect to at-
tain their preferences more swiftly and easily by being good members of their respective
groups. The former MEP John Corrie, for instance, recalled:
I learned to swim with the tide. Because if you were a good European People’s Party
member, and I genuinely was at heart, then you got all the rapporteurships and the posts
that were going. Whereas if you were a hard-line British nationalist, [and didn’t] like
23The delegates of the British Labour party entered the EP did not immediately follow the first enlargement of the Commu-
nities, but only after the British population had confirmed the UK’s membership in a nationwide referendum on 5 June 1975
(Pollack, 2009).
24The interviewees Jean-Pierre Cot, Liam Kavanagh, Heinz Schreiber, Horst Seefeld and Fionnuala Richardson reported
such tensions specifically among British Labour MEPs within the EP’s Socialist Group (of which they were members, ex-
cept Richardson, who worked for the group), but Seefeld and Richardson also recalled later adaptation processes (Inter-
views 1, 13, 16, 17 & 18).
25The interviewees John Corrie, Ole Espersen and Hans-Werner Müller also remembered that they knew little about the EP
upon entering (Interviews 2, 4 & 12). Fionnuala Richardson confirmed that many delegates had little prior knowledge of the
treaties and the EP’s working procedures, and it was part of her task to help them get acquainted with the EP’s functioning
(Interview 13).
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Europe, well, then, you know, they could make it more difficult for you to get good
rapporteurships.
Intra-group unity was also in the MEPs’ own interest for another reason: having only
limited capacities for the fulfilment of their roles as MEPs due to their double mandate,
MEPs usually developed an expertise in only a few and rather narrow policy fields. Yet
they wanted their group to shape Community policies on a broader bandwidth. It hence
served their interests to be able to rely on party-group colleagues with an expertise in
other areas, but sharing a common basis of general political preferences and ideas
(Ringe, 2010, p. 34).
The logic of consequentiality to follow the own group’s lines contributed hence to an
intra-EP horizontal Europeanization both at the micro and macro level. It made individual
MEPs adapt their behaviour so as to support their group’s strength and position, while at
the same time consolidating the EP’s party-group structure, thus increasing its resem-
blance to a parliament. Most of the MEPs interviewed confirmed the existence of
intra-group unity, and stated that voting lines were followed except for ‘very rare’ (Inter-
view 17) occasions in which individual MEPs had the impression that national interests
were being undermined. Even then, however, MEPs would usually leave the plenary dur-
ing the vote, rather than vote against their group, in order to not impair the internal unity
displayed by their group.27 Such behaviour suggests a commonly accepted logic of appro-
priateness among MEPs in terms of intra-group behaviour.
At times, the learning processes that the MEPs underwent in the EP’s group and com-
mittee system reached beyond the Community level, for instance, in the occasional trans-
fer of EP procedures back to national parliaments. The Irish former MEP Charles
McDonald recalled such a case of vertical Europeanization of domestic parliamentary
procedures. He claimed in an interview with the author that he had introduced in the Irish
Parliament a rule he had learnt to appreciate in the EP; namely that civil servants – advi-
sors, researchers or officials – could join MPs in committee meetings to provide detailed
background information on proposals and draft legislation (Interview 7).28 This had previ-
ously not been allowed in the Irish Parliament.
Meso-level vertical Europeanization processes also took place via the EP’s party sys-
tem. By group meetings in the capitals of the member states’ and collaboration within the
EP, MEPs got to know their colleagues’ respective national parties, as well as their
European and transnational party families. The former Italian Socialist MEP Renato
Ballardini, for instance, declared in an interview with the author that he considered that
getting to know European social democracy was the biggest gain of his time in the EP.
Before entering the EP, he (and the Italian Socialists more generally) had a rather negative
image of social democratic parties in western Europe, assuming them to be too close to –
and possibly financed by – capitalism. Meeting French, German and Benelux peers at
Community level and on the EP Socialist Group’s trips, however, led him to understand
that they came from parties that represented and fought for workers’ interests just like his
own party, and that they shared the same ideas and ‘did exactly what we did in Italy’
27So recalled by Alain Terrenoire and Horst Seefeld (Interviews 1 & 8; Seefeld spoke specifically about British Labour
MEPs unwilling to support certain voting lines of the EP’s Socialist Group).
28The EP practice was confirmed in an interview with Fionnuala Richardson, who frequently joined the EP’s Committee on
Social Affairs as member of staff of the EP’s Socialist Group (Interview 13).
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(Interview 19). This learning process had a socializing – and indeed Europeanizing – ef-
fect: it induced Ballardini to identify over time primarily as a European Socialist, rather
than as an Italian one.
Intensified Macro-level Europeanization through Norm Entrepreneurs
Europeanization processes in the EP were propelled by a small group of MEPs who
learned to use the political tools available to them, their multilevel contacts and their in-
creasing knowledge of procedures and policies to pursue political and institutional aims.
These activist MEPs promoted norms and ideas of closer political and institutional inte-
gration and taught new delegates how to make use of the opportunities coming with their
EP mandates to influence Community decision-making through their exemplary behav-
iour, and by involving other delegates in their activism. In particular, they advocated that
of the EP should play a stronger and more parliamentary role, both by assimilating EP
structures and working procedures to national parliaments, and through a strengthened in-
volvement of the EP in Community politics. Inexperienced delegates who entered the EP
with few concrete expectations were heavily influenced by such pre-eminent figures.
Thus, activist MEPs in particular played an intensifying role both in the macro-level
Europeanization of the EP as a whole, and in the micro-level Europeanization of their
peers. Given their impact on the ‘construction of cognitive frames’ in the EP, this small
group of activist MEPs can be considered norm entrepreneurs within the EP, that is,
‘agents having strong notions about appropriate behavior in their Community’ who were
‘critical for norm emergence because they call[ed] attention to issues or even ‘create[d]’
issues’ through the verbalization and dramatization of their aims (Finnemore and
Sikkink, 1998, p. 896-897 ).
MEPs in the role of norm entrepreneurs faced no major obstacles in convincing their
peers to join their activism: to dominantly pro-European delegates, the idea of more EP
parliamentary powers seemed entirely appropriate. Although the normative claims for
more legitimacy through an empowerment of the EP had no direct Treaty basis,29 these
norm entrepreneurs could refer to the norm of parliamentary legitimacy that was generally
accepted at the national level, facilitating the establishment of similar institutional norms
at the Community level.30 Horizontal macro-level Europeanization happened in this re-
gard through the transfer of norms that were well established at the national level to the
supranational institutional system.
It might be assumed that MEPs’ socialization into the EP under the influence of
norm entrepreneurs’ activism was constrained by the delegates’ double mandate, con-
sidering that national parties might have expected their delegates to act in certain ways,
or represent certain positions at Community level. On the contrary, however, the EP of-
fered fertile ground for norm entrepreneurs to influence the socialization of MEPs.
Firstly, the pressure of control by the MEPs’ national parties was weak, because the
29As pointed out, for instance, by the British Labour MEPs Lord Donald Bruce of Donington and John Leslie Prescott dur-
ing the plenary debate on 6 July 1977 with regard to the EP’s upcoming first direct elections (European Parliament, 1977, p.
163 & 173).
30This confirms the findings by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 908) that norm entrepreneurs are able to establish new
normative claims more easily if they can able to refer to existing norms.
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interest in EP activities of most of the MEPs’ national colleagues was low to non-
existent.31 Consequently, MEPs adjusted their actions mostly to the logics of appropri-
ateness and consequentiality determined by the EP’s party groups and committees
and by their own consciences. Secondly, control by the MEPs’ electorates as well as
their national and regional media was similarly weak. Unless the MEPs themselves
approached them on their own initiative, it was unlikely that either their constituents
or the media would show particular interest in what they were doing.32 Based on these
two preconditions, MEPs prior to 1979 could afford to focus on the desired outcomes
of their EP activism not only in the short, but also in the mid-term and long term.
Given that they were not re-elected based on their Community-level activities, delegates
did not have to focus on the next national elections and the attractiveness of their ac-
tions in the EP for their electorate, but could pursue aims that they knew might take
years to achieve, and even longer to be publicly noticed – that is, until the EP’s first
direct elections in 1979.
Conclusion
In 1966, a report by the EP’s Committee on Political Affairs stated that ‘the position
and the influence of the European Parliament depends to a large extent on
itself’(Committee on Political Affairs, 1966, p. 11).33 This quote aptly summarizes the
self-perceptions of MEPs prior to the EP’s first direct elections, as well as their
resulting activism, which aimed at turning the EP from an assembly with limited con-
sultative and control powers into a supranational parliament. Based on the point of view
that it was up to them to try and develop the role for their institution they thought it
deserved, MEPs acted like Euro-parliamentarians rather than as delegates of national
parliaments. This article has analysed the impact of MEPs’ behaviour on the EP’s insti-
tutional development through the lens of Europeanization. It has traced both vertical
and horizontal Europeanization processes in the EP at different levels: the article sheds
light on MEPs’ individual actions and their socialization within the EP (at the micro
level), on the formation, functioning and relevance of party groups and committees
within the EP (at the meso level), and on the gradual parliamentarization of the EP
as a whole through such micro and meso-level processes (at the macro level).
The conceptualization of these processes was facilitated by applying analytical tools
from sociological and rational choice institutionalism within the broader theoretical
framework of Europeanization. Drawing notably on the concepts of logics of appropri-
ateness and consequentiality, and tracing the impact of norms (promoted by a group of
norm entrepreneurs), ideas and interests, institutionalization processes in the early EP
could be identified and explained. Given that there was no electoral pressure for MEPs
to achieve presentable results in the short term, they could afford to pursue long-term
institutional and political aims. The achievement of these aims was facilitated through
31This was stated in Interviews 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 17 & 19. Georges Clerfayt, Doeke Eisma, Lothar Ibrügger and Heinz
Schreiber reported at least some interest of their national party colleagues in their work at Community level (Interviews
6, 11, 16 & 20).
32Arnaldo Ferragni emphasized that the EP’s gradual empowerment prior to 1979 ‘took place without pressure from public
opinion or the media, which at the time – as today – did not have the Community institutions on their list of priorities’ (In-
terview 5).
33Translated by the author.
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the relative unity among MEPs with regard to their shared norms and ideas of European
political and institutional integration more generally, but also through MEPs’ individual
interests with regard to work efficiency and political impact within the EP, as this article
has discussed. Such agreement on logics of appropriateness and consequentiality re-
garding their behaviour in the EP helped MEPs to successfully contest Treaty-given
rules and procedures delimiting the EP’s role, and thus expand this role beyond Treaty
paragraphs.
The present analysis has been limited to the study of internal processes in the EP, es-
pecially of the everyday working procedures, MEPs’ behaviour and their underlying ideas
and interests. In this focus lies one of the article’s main contributions to the literature on
the institutional development of the EP prior to 1979, which has so far mostly examined
the EP’s formal gains in power through Treaty changes, and its relations to – and depen-
dence on – other Community institutions and national governments. This article sought to
show, however, that the remarkable evolution of the EP’s powers, its role in and influence
on Community policy-making cannot be fully understood without taking into consider-
ation the role played by the individual delegates and the importance of evolving everyday
working procedures.
The article thus confirms that previous findings in the literature on the EP
concerning the impact of micro, meso and macro-level processes on the parliament’s
empowerment after 1979 (Daniel, 2015; Hix et al., 2003; Ringe, 2010) apply similarly
to the period prior to 1979. The analysis above has demonstrated that many of these
processes – such as voting behaviour, the distribution of posts, or the dominance of
certain policy and polity-related norms and ideas of the EP’s role and closer integra-
tion – have their roots in the EP’s very beginnings as a part-time assembly, rather than
emerging only at the point when an EP mandate became a full-time job. The behav-
iour of delegated MEPs prior to 1979 differed from that of directly elected MEPs
post-1979 to the extent that the latter had far more resources – in terms of time, staff
and finances – at hand, and did not have to justify the time they spent at the European
level before constituents and national party colleagues to the same extent as delegates
prior to 1979. General patterns of MEP activism, however, show remarkable
continuity.
The EP’s transition into the supranational parliament it is today arguably depended to a
significant extent on the early MEPs’ efforts to make their institution look and operate
much like a typical legislature. Later generations of MEPs learned from the strategic be-
haviour of the early MEPs – amongst others, through their socialization into previously
established parliamentary procedures, and through the exemplary activism of MEPs
who had been delegated to the EP prior to 1979, and became elected members thereafter.
Not only did such behaviour increase the efficiency of EP working procedures; it was also
conducive to convincing member state governments incrementally to provide the EP with
more and more parliamentary powers. After all, only a parliament was considered to have
the power to provide democratic legitimacy to Community politics (Rittberger, 2005).
Such parliamentarization and empowerment processes built – and build – on patterns
of institutional procedures developed early on in the EP’s history, which show strong sim-
ilarities in the pre and post-1979 period. Hence, the findings of this article are highly rel-
evant for a general understanding of the Communities’ shifting balance of powers, which
has shaped the EU’s institutional landscape until today.
Becoming Europe’s parliament, 1952–1979 1427















Renato Ballardini Riva del Garda, 17
Jan 2017
Partito Socialista, Italy SG 1969–74











Jean-Pierre Cot Hamburg, 25
Sept 2017
Parti socialiste, France SG 1978–79, 1984–99





Doeke Eisma Phone interviews,































Liam Kavanagh Phone interview,
2 Sept 2016











Charles McDonald Dublin, 14
Feb 2017
Fine Gael, Ireland CDG 1973–79






Fionnuala Richardson - SG 1974–88
Mechthild Roos1428


















Heinz Schreiber Phone interviews,
27 and 28 June













Vera Squarcialupi Milan, 18 Jan 2017 non-affiliated, Italy ComG 1976–79, 1979–89






















CDG, Christian Democratic group; ComG, Communist group; ConG, Conservative group; EP, European Par-
liament; EPDG, European Progressive Democratic group; LAG, Liberals & Allies group; MEP, member of
the European Parliament; NA, non-affiliated; SG, Socialist group
References
Börzel, T.A. and Risse T. (2003) Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe’. In
Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. M. (eds) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), pp. 57–80.
Committee on Political Affairs (1966) Rapport fait au nom de la commission politique sur la po-
sition du Parlement européen á l’égard de l’évolution institutionnelle récente des
Communautés européennes ainsi que sur les propositions de résolution présentées par M.
Birkelbach et d’autres membres, en date du 8 janvier 1964 (doc. 114, 1963-1964); par Mme
Strobel, au nom du groupe socialiste, en date du 21 octobre 1964 (doc. 93, 1964-1965); par
M. Dichgans, en date du 21 janvier 1965 (doc. 139, 1964-1965); par Mme Strobel, au nom
du groupe socialiste, en date du 13 mai 1966 (doc. 65, 1966-1967, 17 October 1966 (Fondation
Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, ARM 21/4/94).
Corbett, R., Jacobs, F. and Shatterton, M. (2003) ‘The European Parliament at Fifty: AView from
the Inside’. JCMS, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 353–73.
Daniel, W.T. (2015) Career Behaviour and the European Parliament. All Roads Lead Through
Brussels? (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Becoming Europe’s parliament, 1952–1979 1429
© 2020 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons
Ltd
European Parliament (1953a) Resolution on the number, composition and responsibility of com-
mittees, 10 January 1953 (Historical Archives of the European Parliament, AC_AP_RP!
ORGA.1952_AC53-0002!53-janvier0001DE_0001).
European Parliament (1953b) Resolution on the introduction of party groups into the Rules of Pro-
cedure. 16 June 1953 (Historical Archives of the European Parliament, AC_AP_RP!
REGL.1953_AC-0010!53-mai0001DE_0001).
European Parliament (1958) Resolution on the EP’s Rules of Procedure. 23 June 1958 (Historical
Archives of the European Parliament, PE0_AP_RP!REGL.1958_A0-0017!580001DE_0001).
European Parliament (1962) Resolution concerning the designation of the Parliament. 30 March
1962 (Historical Archives of the European Parliament, PE0_AP_PR_B0-0012!
620001DE_0001).
European Parliament (1965) Resolution changing Art. 36 paragraph 5 of the EP’s Rules of Proce-
dure. 20 January 1965 (Historical Archives of the European Parliament, PE0_AP_RP!
JURI.1961_A0–0118!640001DE_0001).
European Parliament (1977) Minutes of the plenary debate. on 6 July 1977 (Historical Archives of
the European Parliament, PE0_AP_DE!1977_DE19770706-019900EN_9394669).
Featherstone, K. (2003) ‘Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe’’. In Featherstone, K. and Radaelli,
C.M. (eds) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 3–26.
Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’. Inter-
national Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 887–917.
Forsyth, M. (1964) Das Parlament der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Cologne: Europa Union).
Graziano, P.R. and Vink, M.P. (2013) ‘Europeanization: Concept, Theory, and Methods’. In
Bulmer, S. and Lequesne, C. (eds) The Member States of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), pp. 31–54.
Haas, E.B. (2004) The Uniting of Europe (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press).
Hagger, M. and Wing, M. (1979) ‘The Deconcentration of Legislative Power: The Development of
Committees in the European Parliament’. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 7, No.
2, pp. 117–46.
Hix, S., Kreppel, A. and Noury, A. (2003) ‘The Party System in the European Parliament:
Collusive or Competitive?’ JCMS, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 309–31.
Judge, D. and Earnshaw, D. (2008) The European Parliament (Basingstoke and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan).
Kardasheva, R. (2009) ‘The Power to Delay: The European Parliament’s Influence in the
Consultation Procedure’. JCMS, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 385–409.
Knudsen, A.-C.L. (2014) ‘The European Parliament and Political Careers at the Nexus of
European Integration and Transnational History’. In Laursen, J. (ed.) The Institutions and
Dynamics of the European Community, 1973–83 (Baden-Baden: Nomos), pp. 76–96.
Kreppel, A. (2002) The European Parliament and Supranational Party System. A Study in
Institutional Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Krumrey, J. (2018) The Symbolic Politics of European Integration. Staging Europe (Cham:
Palgrave Macmillan).
Lindner, J. and Rittberger, B. (2003) ‘The Creation, Interpretation and Contestation of Institutions
– Revisiting Historical Institutionalism’. JCMS, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 445–73.
March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (2011) ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’. In Goodin, R.E. (ed.) The
Oxford Handbook of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 478–97.
Mayring, P. (2014) Qualitative Content Analysis: Theoretical Foundation, Basic Procedures and
Software Solution (Klagenfurt: SSOAR).
McGrath, C. (2009) ‘Oral History and Political elites: Interviewing (and Transcribing) Lobbyists’.
In Kurkowska-Budzan, M. and Zamorski, K. (eds) Oral History. The Challenges of Dialogue
(Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins), pp. 47–60.
Mechthild Roos1430
© 2020 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons
Ltd
Meyer, J.-H. (2014) ‘Getting Started: Agenda-setting in European Environmental Policy in the
1970s’. In Laursen, J. (ed.) The Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community,
1973–83 (Nomos: Baden-Baden), pp. 221–42.
Mühlböck, M. and Rittberger, B. (2015) ‘The Council, the European Parliament, and the paradox
of Inter-institutional cooperation’. In Neuhold, C. and Vanhoonacker, S. (eds) Dynamics of In-
stitutional Cooperation in the European Union: Dimensions and Effects. European Integration
Online Papers, Vol. 1, No. 19, Article 4.
Murray, P. (2004) ‘Factors for Integration? Transnational Party Cooperation in the European Par-
liament, 1952–1979’. Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 102–15.
Pollack, A. (2009) Wreckers or Builders? A History of Labour Members of the European
Parliament 1979–1999 (London: John Harper).
Radaelli, C.M. (2003) ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’. In Featherstone, K. and
Radaelli, C.M. (eds) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
pp. 27–56.
Ringe, N. (2010) Who Decides, and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy Choice in the
European Parliament (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Ripoll Servent, A. (2018) The European Parliament (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
Ritchie, D.A. (2015) Doing Oral History (New York: Oxford University Press).
Rittberger, B. (2005) Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond the
Nation State (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Rittberger, B. (2006) ‘’No Integration without Representation!’ European Integration, Parliamen-
tary Democracy, and Two Forgotten Communities’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.
13, No. 8, pp. 1211–29.
Roos, M. (2017) ‘Far Beyond the Treaties Clauses: The European Parliament’s Gain in Power,
1952–1979’. Journal of European Contemporary Research, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 1055–75.
Roos, M. (2019) ‘Intra-party Group Unity in the European Parliament Prior to its First Direct Elec-
tions in 1979’. Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 464–79.
Thompson, P. and Bornat, J. (2017) The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press).
Viola, D.M. (2016) ‘The Genesis of the European Parliament. From Appointed Consultative As-
sembly to Directly Elected Legislative Body’. In Viola, D.M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of
European Elections (Abingdon, London, and New York: Routledge), pp. 3–16.
Interviews
Interview 1: Horst Seefeld (German MEP 1970-79 and 1979-89, Socialist Group), se-
ries ofphone interviews and e-mails (Feb-Oct 2017).
Interview 2: Ole Espersen (Danish MEP 1974-77, Socialist Group), phone interviews
(1 June2017).
Interview 3: Maarten Engwirda (Dutch MEP 1971-73, non-affiliated), phone interview
(12 May 2017).
Interview 4: Hans-Werner Müller (German MEP 1977-79, Christian Democratic
Group), Wadern (12 June 2017).
Interview 5: Arnaldo Ferragni (Italian member of staff 1960-72, from 1966 Secretary-
General, Christian Democratic Group), series of e-mails (March 2018).
Interview 6: Lothar Ibrügger (German MEP 1978-79, Socialist Group), Brussels (18
Feb 2017).
Becoming Europe’s parliament, 1952–1979 1431
© 2020 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons
Ltd
Interview 7: Charles McDonald (Irish MEP 1973-79, Christian Democratic Group),
Dublin (14 Feb 2017).
Interview 8: Alain Terrenoire (French MEP 1973-78, European Progressive Demo-
cratic Group), Paris (20 June 2017).
Interview 9: Werner Zywietz (German MEP 1977-79, Liberals and Allies Group),
phone interview (21 Sept 2016).
Interview 10: Vera Squarcialupi (Italian MEP 1976-79 and 1979-89, Communist
Group), Milan (18 Jan 2017).
Interview 11: Doeke Eisma (Dutch MEP 1973-74, 1981-84 and 1994-99, Socialist
Group), phone interviews (21 and 27 Oct 2016).
Interview 12: John Alexander Corrie (British MEP 1975, 1977-79 and 1994-2004,
Conservative Group), phone interview (21 Sept 2016).
Interview 13: Fionnuala Richardson (Irish member of staff 1974-88, from 1980 Dep-
uty Secretary-General, Socialist Group), Dublin (14 Feb 2017).
Interview 14: Dick Taverne (British MP 1973-74, non-affiliated), London (10 Nov
2016).
Interview 15: Arie van der Hek (Dutch MEP 1973-77, Socialist Group), phone inter-
view (19 Oct 2016).
Interview 16: Heinz Schreiber (German MEP 1977-79 and 1984-89, Socialist Group),
phone interviews (27 and 28 June and 11 Aug 2017).
Interview 17: Jean-Pierre Cot (French MEP 1978-79 and 1984-99, Socialist Group),
Hamburg (25 Sept 2017).
Interview 18: Liam Kavanagh (Irish MEP 1973-79 and 1979-81, Socialist Group),
Skype interview (2 Sept 2016).
Interview 19: Renato Ballardini (Italian MEP 1969-74, Socialist Group), Riva del
Garda (17 Jan 2017).
Interview 20: Georges Clerfayt (Belgian MEP 1975-77, non-affiliated), phone inter-
view (12 July 2017)
Mechthild Roos1432
© 2020 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons
Ltd
